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DATE OF APPROVAL: *April, 14, 1972*

DEGREE: Master of Arts

DATE OF GRADUATION: June 1972

BYSTANDER INTERVENTION: THE EFFECT OF LEADER TYPE
ON HELPING BEHAVIOR

This study was designed to investigate the phenomenon of helping behavior in a crisis situation from a group process-leadership approach. Previous studies had approached the problem from a group aggregate or non-interaction viewpoint and either had not actually employed a crisis in their designs or had so approached the problem as to preclude specification of the processes operating in an interacting group under such conditions.

Three leadership types were employed: Emergent, Appointed, and Pseudo-elected. Numerous typologies of leadership have been proposed; this particular typology was employed because it is salient for the situation under study, allowing for insights into the process of leader emergence in both normal group processes and emergency coping and allowing for a test of which variable is more important for leadership - the position of leadership itself or the qualifications of the individual holding that position.

Two specific hypotheses were tested: 1. In a crisis, an Emergent leader should act more quickly and be more effective than a leader who in fact has no leadership qualities (the Pseudo-elected), as defined by the criteria of emergent leader-

ship. An arbitrarily Appointed leader should fall somewhere between these two. 2. There should be more overthrowing of leaders in the Pseudo-elected condition than in either of the other two conditions.

The experimental design employed was the following: Five subjects (one of whom was the confederate of the experimenter) met ostensibly to study group problem-solving. They were given personality questionnaires and, in an initial familiarization exchange, the confederate said that he had diabetes and could not get overworked or overexcited due to his health. After a sample problem had been discussed, a group leader was selected in one of the following manners: Appointed leader (the third subject to arrive at the experimental room was appointed by the experimenter); Emergent leader (subjects wrote down the name of the subject whom they wanted as leader; the experimenter always named the subject highest in emergent leader qualities); Pseudo-elected (subjects "elected" leader in above manner; the experimenter always named the subject lowest in emergent leader qualities).

Discussion of the problems then began, with the experimenter being absent. During the discussion of the fourth problem, the confederate complained that he was having a diabetic reaction and needed sugar; he said he could not get it himself and needed help. The experimenter observed the resulting behaviors, noting what was done by the leader and other group members.

The criterion of helping was the departure from the ex-

perimental room by a subject in search of aid. If this did not occur by the end of three minutes after the confederate had asked for help, the experiment was terminated. Next, each subject was asked for a detailed description of the occurrences. The actual purpose of the experiment was then explained and all subjects were given a final questionnaire concerning their reactions.

The results supported both hypotheses. Leader type had a major effect on the likelihood and speed of aiding, with Emergent leader groups reporting the emergency quickest and most often and Pseudo-elected leader groups the slowest and least often. The highest number of leader overthrows was recorded in Pseudo-elected leader groups; Emergent leader groups showed no overthrows. Personality and background measures showed no significant correlations with speed of response. Reactions to the experiment were very favorable as shown by the subjects' responses to the final questionnaire.

Several explanations for these results were discussed and related to several theories dealing with the area under study. The varieties of helping behaviors were also discussed and several variations of the study were presented.

BYSTANDER INTERVENTION: THE EFFECT OF LEADER TYPE
ON HELPING BEHAVIOR

by

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A THESIS


Submitted to the Office for Graduate Studies,
Graduate Division of Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

1972

MAJOR: PSYCHOLOGY

APPROVED BY:

 April 14, 1972
Adviser Date

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My deepest gratitude is expressed to Dr. Ira J. Firestone for his patience, counsel, and encouragement through each phase of this study. The many hours which he sacrificed to critically analyze, insightfully suggest, and advise were largely responsible for the production of this study. He has been both a teacher and a friend. My sincere appreciation is also extended to Drs. Cary Lichtman and Gloria Cowan for their constructive comments, further refinement of the ideas presented in the manuscript, and suggestions for further research. I wish also to thank Dr. Daniel Ziegler of Villanova University for allowing me to use the facilities of his department for the actual conducting of this study. Lastly, I wish to express my deepest thanks to my family for their patience, concern, and support during the time involved in producing the study.

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CHAPTER I

Introduction

In March 1964, a young woman, Kitty Genovese, was brutally attacked and stabbed to death in the middle of a street in Kew Garden, a residential section of New York City. Although the woman repeatedly screamed for help, and although her attacker took more than half an hour to kill her, not one of the thirty-eight people who observed the encounter from the safety of their own apartments came out to assist her. Not one of the thirty-eight witnesses even lifted the telephone to call police to aid the girl.

This incident received enormous publicity. Many newspaper feature articles (e.g., Rosenthal, 1964a) and magazine stories were written about it, a popular television show was based on a fictionalized version of the incident, an hour-long television special and a full length book were done on it, and several movies were based on this incident and others similar to it. This case served to crystalize the concern that had been growing around a large number of similar incidents - stabbings on crowded subways, ignoring of automobile victims, robberings in plain sight of passersby, and so on. Newspapers and other editorialists seized upon these and similar occurrences to castigate Americans for their apathy and indifference in the face of human distress; we have been warned of the dehumanizing consequences of living in big cities, despaired over the moral decay of which such incidents are only examples, and attacked for our growing self-centeredness and anomie.

Although such interpretations have their point, interviews with the bystanders in this and other similar situations suggest rather different explanations for their inaction. For example, in the case cited above, several of the onlookers later reported that they thought that the victim and her attacker were merely lovers having a quarrel in which it would be inappropriate to interfere. Others felt that since they were not the only ones watching, somebody else surely had already done something. Still others were seemingly afraid to "stick out their necks" and possibly get into trouble. Others responded that they simply did not want to get involved (Latane & Darley, 1966; Rosenthal, 1964a, 1964b). Whatever we may think of such reasons, they do suggest that factors other than apathy and indifference may affect the likelihood that a bystander will intervene in the face of an emergency.

Latane & Darley (1970) suggest that situational factors, specifically factors involving the immediate social environment, may be of greater importance in determining an individual's reaction to an emergency than such vague cultural or personality concepts as "apathy" or "alienation due to urbanization". They suspect that the major variance in behavior in helping situations will be determined by the various conclusions and interpretations each person makes and the various rewards and costs he sees, rather than by his overall willingness to adhere to social norms or to act generously or compassionately.

These other factors may arise out of the dynamics of the emergency situation in which the person finds himself. These

may provide him with alternative explanations for the emergency or with reasons why he himself is not the appropriate person to intervene and thus may make reasonable and less reprehensible his failures to take action.

Such events have generated much research in the areas of helping behavior, altruism, "Good Samaritanism", etc., by social scientists, but no one has yet looked at these phenomena from a group process-leadership point of view. Investigators have intensively studied such topics as altruism in children and adults (for reviews of the literature on children, see Bryan & London, 1970, on altruism in general, see Kribs, 1970), risk-taking in groups, interpersonal attraction and helping (Epstein & Hornstein, 1969), and the norm of social responsibility (Berkowitz & Daniels, 1963, 1964); and bystander intervention in emergency situations from an individual or aggregate viewpoint (Latane & Darley, 1970). The following study was designed to "bridge the gap" between these two areas of investigation by looking at helping behavior from a group process-leadership point of view.

A review of these various areas of investigation will help to point out some of the results which have been found and will also serve to point out the shortcomings of these studies for the area under investigation in this study.

Research on Helping Behavior

Experiments on animals (Barnett, 1963; Church, 1959; Hall, 1936; Latane, 1968; Latane & Glass, 1968; Rice & Gainer, 1962) and on men (Berkowitz & Daniels, 1963, 1964; Berkowitz & Connor,

1966; Alderman & Berkowitz, 1970; Schopler, 1967; Tilker, 1970) show that there may be a motive (Social Responsibility) to help other organisms in distress. Rice & Gainer, for example, have found that rats will attempt to help another rat in trouble unless they are rebuffed by the rat in difficulty.

Berkowitz and Schopler have both studied one aspect of social responsibility: the variables determining the degree of help given to a person who is dependent upon the help given. However, the situation in which they are interested cannot be described as an emergency situation, but rather as task aiding or doing favors for another who is not in trouble.

Wheeler (1966) has suggested that, in the example given above of the murder in New York City, had anyone individual made a visible attempt to aid the victim, the fear would probably have been reduced in others of the observers, who would then have acted. Wheeler bases this suggestion on his theory of behavioral contagion, in which he predicts that behavioral contagion (i.e., in this case, the intervention of the observers in the attack situation) is mediated by the lowering of the observers' avoidance gradient in an approach-avoidance conflict. Indeed, numerous experiments have observed this modeling effect, showing that volunteering behavior is increased by the observation of others volunteering (e.g., Rosenbaum & Blake, 1955; Schachter & Hall, 1952, Bryan & Test, 1967).

In a series of studies, Wallach, Kogan, and Bem have studied the parameters of risk-taking by a group, albeit in a very

abstract situation (giving advice to an imaginary protagonist). Groups move toward enhanced risk-taking because the members are able to pool their cognitive resources toward making more rational accounts of the probabilities and desirabilities involved in their various decision alternatives (Wallach et al., 1964; Bem et al., 1965). Risk-taking is more socially desirable than conservatism, and hence, the publicity of decisions present in the group setting generates greater risk-taking. Knowing that one will undergo the consequences of one's decisions in the company of others induces a willingness to take greater risks because of the presumed sympathy that these others will provide in the event of negative outcomes (Wallach & Kogan, 1965).

Rettig et al. (1967) studied the relationship between group responsibility and ethical risk-taking. The results showed that sharing the responsibility with other group members, who are expected to collaborate, produces high ethical risk-taking, but group members must be known to each other for the effect to occur. Sharing responsibility with unknown partners inhibits rather than facilitates ethical risk-taking.

While these findings may be relevant for the present area of concern, one limitation of all of these social psychological studies is that the tasks involved in them are not, and do not involve, real emergency situations or interpersonal crises in which direct physical action must be taken. For example, the Wallach & Kogan studies deal with the giving of advice in a hypothetical risk-taking situation; in the Rettig et al. study,

the task was tracing a straight line. Neither of these situations can be equated with the taking of personal and direct action in an everyday situation.

In an ongoing series of studies, Latane and Darley (Darley & Latane, 1968a, 1968b; Latane & Darley, 1966, 1968; Latane & Rodin, 1969; Latane & Darley, 1970) have begun an attempt to find the parameters involved in intervention in an emergency situation. They feel that the failure of bystanders to intervene in emergencies reflects influences on the ways in which people interpret situations and reward and cost structures, rather than a lessened tendency to follow moral norms or a lessened degree of compassion. Alienation from social norms or apathy about the fate of others may be oversimplified and therefore incorrect explanations for the unresponsive bystander. They feel that the answer may lie in the various decisions the bystander must make before he intervenes.

Darley & Latane (1968b) found that the mere perception that other people are also witnessing the event will markedly decrease the likelihood that an individual will intervene in an emergency situation. Individuals heard a person undergoing a severe epileptic-like fit in another room. In one experimental condition, the subject thought that he was the only person who heard the emergency, in a second condition, he thought that there was one other person who heard the seizure, and in the third condition, he thought that four other persons were also aware of the seizure. Subjects alone with the victim were much

more likely to intervene on his behalf, and, on the average, reacted in less than one-third the time required by the subjects who thought other bystanders were present. This result was also confirmed by Latane & Rodin (1969) who found that two-person groups were less likely to offer assistance to a woman who had supposedly fallen and injured her leg than were subjects who were alone, although pairs of friends were less inhibited than pairs of strangers and helped significantly faster.

Latane & Darley (1968) found that subjects were less likely to report an emergency (smoke filling a room) when in the presence of passive others or in groups of three than when alone. This result seemed to have been mediated by the way the subjects interpreted the ambiguous situation: seeing others remain passive led subjects to decide that the smoke was not dangerous.

These investigations have used situations with contrived and restricted communications. This approach is appropriate for investigating certain classes of problems but this very methodological approach has prevented the investigation of the manner by which an interacting group deals with a crisis, a situation which may better mirror what is actually taking place.

The experimental paradigm used in the Latane & Darley studies has not allowed for any possible effects which leadership may exert in the situation. They have not attempted to control the interaction of observers in such a way as to rule

out the interference of individuals who may be disposed to take charge and initiate action and influence other observer-subjects. The other "subjects" involved in these studies were either confederates of the experimenter (e.g., Latane & Darley, 1968) or were not actually present (e.g., Darley & Latane, 1968b). What happens when there is a leader present, one of whose duties it is to accomplish the goals of the group as efficiently and quickly as possible? Will different types of leaders react differently to an emergency situation?

Relevant Research on Leadership

Various descriptions and typologies of leaders have been proposed and studied (e.g., Anderson & Fiedler, 1964; Bass, 1961; Beer et al., 1959; Borgatta et al., 1959; Hare, 1957). One distinction between leader types or styles which has been suggested is that between emergent and imposed (appointed) leaders (Hollander, 1964). This particular approach to leadership type was employed in the present study. This approach was decided upon because it was felt that it was the most salient type for the particular situation under investigation. It allows for insights into the process of leader emergence in both normal group processes and in emergency coping. This conception of leadership also allows for a test of the question of which variable is more important for group leadership - appointment to the position, i.e., the position itself, or the qualities of the individual who holds that position.

Bass and others have studied initially leaderless groups

and have observed the process of emergent leadership (Bass, 1949, 1961; Bass et al., 1953; Heinecke & Bales, 1953). In a leaderless group discussion, one task may be assumed by several people, some tasks may be assumed by one person, some tasks may not be performed at all. These tasks include: initiation or formulation of the problems and goals of the group, organization of the group's thinking, clarification of the responses of others, outlining the discussion, summarizing, generalizing, obtaining the group's agreement, and formulating conclusions. It is assumed that those individuals who carry out the above mentioned tasks are perceived by others to be the leader of the group discussion (Bass, 1949).

The usual process in initially leaderless groups is that an individual emerges as leader typically by the second experimental session (Heinecke & Bales, 1953) and has consolidated his position and thereafter can allow others to become more active.

The emergent leader thus possesses (by definition) the qualities and skills necessary for group guidance in the specific situation. By dint of these qualities and skills he assumes the leadership position and is in turn perceived by the other members of the group as the leader.

An appointed or imposed leader may or may not possess the skills necessary for his position. He may be an arbitrary appointment by the power structure of an organization (or by an experimenter) and may be perceived by the other group mem-

bers as leader in name only. Or he may have been appointed because he does not possess the knowledge and skills necessary for his position and the group tasks. Either of these possibilities may be true for a given group. It is necessary to observe the appointed leader in action in order to see his qualifications and the way in which he is perceived by the other group members. A crisis situation allows for such observation.

What happens in organized groups when they are faced with a crisis or stressful situation? Torrance (in Petrullo & Bass, 1967) has proposed a theory of leadership and interpersonal behavior under stress. It is Torrance's contention that the distinctive element in stress is to be found in the lack of structure or loss of an anchor in reality experienced by the group as a result of the stressful condition. This lack of structure or loss of anchor in reality makes it difficult or impossible for the group to cope with the requirements of the situation, and the problem of leadership becomes one of evolving or supplying a structure or anchor and of supplying the expertness for coping with the demands of the situation.

Torrance lists a large number of specific stressors which can lead to various consequences for the group and the leader (e.g., failure of group objectives, attack, difficult tasks, loss of a group member, and sudden emergencies). Theoretically, any one of the specific stressors may lead to any of the consequences or symptoms (e.g., panic, disorganization, dissolution of the group, interpersonal strife, lack of trust, and mutiny).

Among the stressors which are relevant to the present discussion are: sudden emergencies, the presence of an incompetent or unpredictable member, and the loss of a group member. Among the possible consequences of these stressors are: panic or disorganization, dissolution of the group, interpersonal strife, lack of trust, and mutiny. If a person is granted the right to exercise important leadership functions for a group, he must meet to some degree the group's expectations or he will lose his following.

Jones and Gerard (1968) suggest that a condition of emergency should centralize leadership and Torrance (1958) shows that groups prefer continuity of leadership from stressful to nonstressful situations. Even established leaders, however, must continue to validate their leadership or power roles by providing the structure and expertness necessary for group survival. When there is no designated leader, whoever is able and willing to provide the essential structure will emerge as the leader. There may be conflicts or even failure to survive when the designated leader fails to provide the essential structure and expertness (Torrance, 1954).

Hamblin (1958) reports that the most influential person is more influential under crisis conditions than control conditions. However, the crisis leaders in Hamblin's experiment were more often deposed than the corresponding leaders in the control condition when they did not quickly bring a solution to the crisis. Thus it appears that ineffectual leaders are

not tolerated when the stakes are high.

Hypotheses

On the basis of the foregoing discussion, if groups with different types of leaders are placed in a crisis situation which threatens one of their members and upon which they must take action, we could expect to find differing responses to the emergency on the part of the different types of leaders. The following study is an attempt to look at the resulting reactions of groups and their leaders to a crisis situation. Specifically, three types of leaders are studied: the true emergent leader (Emergent leader), an arbitrarily imposed leader (Appointed leader), and an appointed leader who is the least effective member of the group (termed here the Pseudo leader).

From the hypothesis of centralization of authority under stress of Jones and Gerard and the findings of the studies by Hamblin and Heinecke & Bales, it can be predicted that in the crisis situation the Emergent leader will be the most likely to take charge, in order to protect and consolidate his position and to again demonstrate to the group that he has the skills necessary to be leader.

On the basis of Hamblin's findings, where ineffective leaders were overthrown, it can be proposed that the Pseudo leader, who is actually the least effective member of the group, should be overthrown more often and not take as active a role as the Emergent leader who would be expected to act in an assertive, aggressive manner.

The arbitrarily Appointed leader should fall somewhere in between the Emergent and Pseudo leaders in terms of the role played during the crisis, due to the possibility that, by chance, some of the time this individual may be an effective leader and thus could be expected to perform in a more efficient manner during the crisis than the Pseudo leader.

The specific hypotheses, then, are: 1. In a crisis situation, an Emergent leader should act more quickly and be more effective than a leader who in fact has no leadership qualities, as defined by the criteria of emergent leadership. An arbitrarily Appointed leader should fall somewhere between these two. 2. There should be more overthrowing of leaders (or mutinies by followers) in the Pseudo leader condition than in either the Appointed leader condition or the Emergent leader condition.

CHAPTER II

Method and Procedure

Subjects

The subjects who participated in the study were 156 male undergraduate students (mostly sophomores) enrolled in the introductory psychology course.

Introductory Procedure

Subjects were scheduled five at a time. Of these, four were actual subjects, the fifth was the confederate of the experimenter and was present at all experimental sessions.

The subjects were told that the purpose of the study was to look at group processes and to see how people work together. They were told that they were going to be given a series of problem-solving situations which they were to discuss among themselves and then arrive at a solution to each problem. At this time they were also given a series of personality questionnaires¹ and a personal data form (see Appendix A) to fill out. They were given these questionnaires, they were told, so that the experimenter could get some idea of the characteristics of those who were taking part in the study.

After these were filled out and collected, the subjects were then told: "Before you start on the problems themselves, I'd like you to get to know each other a little bit better." Subjects were then instructed to give their first names, and some of their academic and outside interests, such as sports

¹The specific personality questionnaires were those used by Latane & Darley (1968): Berkowitz Social Responsibility Scale, Christie's Machiavellianism Scale, F Scale (Christie's revision), and Marlowe-Crowne Need for Approval Scale.

and hobbies. During this period of discussion, with the experimenter present, the confederate of the experimenter mentioned to the other subjects that he did not "go in much" for sports because he had diabetes and had to take insulin and physical activity and excitement were not good for his condition.

The experimenter then said: "I'd like to give you one of these problems that I've been talking about to see how you do on it and to make sure there are no problems with it. It's also going to be necessary for one of you to act as group leader and we'll decide who that will be after you run through this sample problem." Subjects were then given the sample problem and told to come to a decision within five minutes time, writing down their answer and the reasons why they had come to this conclusion.

Manipulation of Leadership Style

After this had been accomplished and any problems that arose were taken care of,² the group leader was selected according to one of the following methods (in none of the conditions was the confederate of the experimenter selected as leader):

1. Appointed leader: E arbitrarily appointed a member of the group to be the leader. This was always the third subject to arrive at the experimental room.
2. Emergent leader: E instructed each S to write down on a slip of paper the first name of the person he thought would be the best one to lead the group. These were collected and

²Few problems on the part of Ss were encountered; those that did arise were concerned with the time limit (e.g., "Do we have to take all five minutes or can we go on to the next problem after we're done the first one?) and with re-reading the sample problem.

the most popular member was appointed leader. E told the leader that he had been selected most often by his fellows. (In all cases in this group, the S selected was the one who spoke the most and made the most suggestions during the practice session, as observed by E.)

3. Pseudo-elected leader: E gave Ss the same instructions as in method 2, but said that the one selected as leader was the S whom E observed to do the least talking and offered the least suggestions during the practice session; however, the other Ss believed him to be the one they selected.

Experimental Procedure

After the leader had been selected in one of the above manners, the experimenter told the group that he would be giving them five problems of the type they had just discussed and solved. He told the group the following: "What I want you to do is this: The leader will read what the problem is and then you will all discuss it and come to a solution as to what should be done about the problem. When you have done so, the leader will bring the result to me in my office down the hall where I will look at the way you solved the problem. I will then give him the next problem to be solved. Remember that you will have five minutes to solve each problem, so be sure to work within that framework of time. Are there any questions before I give you the first problem?"

After any questions were answered by the experimenter, he then gave the leader the first problem typed on a slip of paper.

The experimenter then left the room, ostensibly to go to his office to await the completion of the first problem. Actually, he did go to his office which was two rooms down the hall and then went from there into the room between the experi-

mental room and his office where he and another confederate observed the group at work through a one-way mirror, where he noted the S who gave the greatest and least amount of suggestions, elaborations, compromises, etc. As the group reached a solution to the problem, the experimenter would go back into his office, receive the result from the leader, and then give him the next in the series of problems.

During the discussion of the fourth problem, the confederate of the experimenter, who had acted in an agitated restless manner during the previous problems, began to complain that he was having a diabetic reaction and that he needed some sugar; he said that he could not get the sugar himself and that he needed help. While saying these things he looked in the direction of the group leader. The experimenter observed the various actions taken to aid the confederate and noted what was done by the leader and by the other members of the group during the crisis situation.

Measurement of Helping Behavior

If one of the Ss left the experimental room to report the trouble or to take some other action, he was stopped by the second confederate of the experimenter, asked what was the matter, and told to return to the experimental room. The second confederate told the subject that the situation "would be taken care of." The criterion of helping, then, was the departure from the experimental room by a subject in search of help for the victim. If the group had not done something to directly get aid for the victim and attempt to alleviate the trouble by

the time three minutes had elapsed from the time the confederate first asked for help, the experiment was terminated by the experimenter.

After either of these alternatives had occurred, the experimenter entered the experimental room and asked what was taking place. When told about the confederate, as he invariably was, the experimenter called to the second confederate and asked him to take the ailing subject to the infirmary. The experimenter then asked for a detailed explanation of what had happened and asked each subject what he had done. He then asked the rest of the subjects to wait while he talked to the leader alone in his office, "to talk about the situation and the problems they had solved and what should be done now." Here, the leader was asked for a detailed account of what had happened and what he had done and why. After this, the experimenter explained the true purpose of the experiment, allayed any fears the leader had and answered any questions he had. He then went back to the experimental room and explained the true purpose of the experiment to the other three subjects, etc. They were all given a final questionnaire then concerning their mood and their reactions to the experiment (see Appendix B). Subjects were assured that their answers would be entirely anonymous and confidential. All subjects were asked to keep the purpose and occurrences of the experiment in strict confidence and were then dismissed.

CHAPTER III

Results

Plausibility of Manipulation

Judging by the subjects' nervousness when they reported the seizure to the experimenter, by responses while the emergency was taking place, by their responses to questions of the experimenter, and by their surprise when they were told during the postexperimental interview that the seizure was not real, one can conclude that all of the subjects perceived the emergency as being real. There were no exceptions in any of the experimental conditions and consequently there was no need to drop the data of any of the subjects from the analysis.

Effect of Leader Type on Helping

The type of leader in the group had a major effect on the likelihood and speed with which the emergency was reported, as is shown in Table 1. Eighty-four percent of the groups which had Emergent leaders (11 of 13 groups) reported the fit before the end of the three minutes time, forty-six percent of groups with an Appointed leader (6 of 13 groups) did so, while only twenty-three percent of the groups with a Pseudo-elected leader (3 of 13 groups) did so. A Chi-square analysis of this data showed significant differences between these groups ($p < .01$).

Speed of Response

To achieve a more detailed analysis of the results, each group's time score was transformed into a "speed score" (Darley & Latane, 1968b), by taking the reciprocal of the response time in seconds and multiplying it by 100. The effect

TABLE 1.-- The effects of leader type on the likelihood and speed of response

leader type	N	% responding by 3 minutes	\bar{X} time in sec.	speed score
Emergent	13	84	46	.53
Appointed	13	46	73	.37
Pseudo-elected	13	23	103	.16

of this transformation was to de-emphasize differences between longer time scores, thus reducing the contribution to the results of the arbitrary three minute time limit on scores. A high speed score indicates a fast response (see Table 1.).

An analysis of variance indicates that the effect of type of leader is highly significant ($p < .01$). Duncan multiple-range tests indicate that all groups differ significantly from one another ($p < .05$).

Figure 1. presents the cumulative proportion of subjects who had intervened by any point in time following the seizure. For example, Figure 1. shows that by the end of 60 seconds 68% of the Emergent leader groups, 37% of the Appointed leader groups, and 16% of the Pseudo-elected leader groups had intervened. The shape of the curve indicates that even had the emergency lasted longer than 180 seconds, little further intervention would have taken place.

Effect of Leader Type on Overthrows

In all of the 13 groups headed by an Emergent leader, the leader was observed by the experimenter to be the one who also led during the emergency situation. In these groups, the leader maintained the control of the group; it was he who asked the confederate what was wrong and what specifically needed to be done; it was also he who either delegated someone to carry out what was needed to be done ("Get the experimenter", "Go get him some sugar, fast") or who took it upon himself to do what needed to be done. Thus, in the groups with a Emergent leader, it was the leader who took control of the emergency.

Cumulative
Proportion
Helping




FIGURE 1.--Cumulative Proportion of Leaders Helping In the Emergent, Appointed, and Pseudo-elected Leader Conditions

The other members of the group were still followers in these groups.

The situation was quite different in the other types of groups, however. In the groups with the Appointed leaders, only eight of these leaders maintained their positions during the emergency, as is shown in Table 2. In the five groups in which there was an "overthrow" (i.e., someone other than the leader directed what was to be done), the subject who took over was the subject who would have been termed the Emergent leader in that group. These subjects had shown themselves to be the most dominant in the discussion of the problems in terms of the number of suggestions offered, contributions made, compromises made, etc., as observed by the experimenter.

The groups with the Pseudo-elected leaders experienced the most "overthrows", as is shown in Table 2.; nine of these leaders were overthrown by a more dominant member of the group. Those subjects who took command of the situation were, as in the previous group, those who would have been termed the Emergent leader in a leaderless group situation.

From these figures, it can be seen that group structure had a direct effect on the proportion of overthrows of leaders by followers. Groups headed by Emergent leaders had little or no difficulty in making a transition from a group discussion to an emergency: the Emergent leader maintained his control over the group in both situations. Groups not headed by an Emergent leader had difficulty in making this

TABLE 2.--Number of overthrows per group

leader type	number overthrown	number not overthrown
Emergent	0	13
Appointed	5	8
Pseudo- elected	9	4

transition from one type of situation to another: the groups led by Appointed or Pseudo-elected leaders suffered overthrows before they were able to capably deal with the emergency situation.

The typical overthrow took place in the following manner: after the confederate had made his plea for help, the leader of the group was either slow to act or turned to the others in the group to find out what to do. At this, the dominant member of the group took charge of the situation and usually delegated someone to do something specific to get help for the ailing group member. Normally, the newly emergent leader would delegate this job to one of the other members of the group other than the now deposed leader. As Table 3A shows, in an overthrow of a Pseudo-elected leader, in only 11% of the cases did the new leader delegate the job to the former leader, while in 89% of the cases he delegated the duty to another group member. In the case of an overthrow of an Appointed leader, the new leader delegated the job to the former leader in 40% of the cases, and to another group member in 60% of the cases.

These results are in agreement with the delegation of duty in groups not suffering an overthrow. Table 3B shows these results. Leaders who were not overthrown generally delegated the job of obtaining aid to another group member. In only two cases (15%) did an Emergent leader attempt to seek help himself; 85% of the time they delegated this duty to another member of the group. Appointed leaders and Pseudo-elect-

TABLE 3A.--Delegation of duty to get help by new leader after overthrow

type of Leader overthrow	no. of overthrows	no. delegated to former Leader	%	no. delegated to other group member	%
Pseudo- elected	9	1	11%	8	89%
Appointed	5	2	40%	3	60%

TABLE 3B.--Delegation of duty to get help in non-overthrow groups

type of leader	no. not overthrown	no. in which leader got help himself	%	no. delegated to other group member	%
Emergent	13	2	13%	11	85%
Appointed	8	2	25%	6	75%
Pseudo- elected	4	1	25%	3	75%

ted leaders who were not overthrown also followed this trend: two of the 8 Appointed leaders (25%) and one of the 4 Pseudo-elected leaders (25%) who were not overthrown attempted to get help on their own part.

Reactions of Other Subjects

In those groups in which the leader (no matter what type) maintained his position, the other members of the group generally followed his instructions and his lead in helping the subject in trouble. In other words, if the leader told a group member to get the experimenter or to get the confederate some sugar, the group member so instructed did so. Thus, the leader maintained control not only of the situation but also of the other group members. This control was also characteristic of those groups which suffered an overthrow of the leader by another. Pseudo-elected leader or Appointed leader groups suffering an overthrow were characterized by disagreements about who should do what and what should be done before the overthrow; after the new leader had taken over, the members followed his directions quickly and with no more difficulty than those groups which maintained their original leaders. Thus, it can be seen that for these types of groups, an overthrow and someone new taking charge is essential for quick reaction to the emergency.

Types of Helping Behavior

There are numerous behaviors which are possible in this situation which could be termed or classified as helping behavior. These behaviors may appear at different times. For exam-

ple, the mere asking of the stricken person "What is the matter?" could possibly be classified under this heading. This is very different from the active seeking of some external object to alleviate the emergency. Thus, helping behavior may vary from asking what the trouble is, to a pat on the hand, to getting a policeman to help, to the risking of one's life to help the person in the crisis.

In the situation under study there are various things which could conceivably be done to help the person suffering from the "seizure". This presents a methodological problem in terms of measuring the time of onset of the crisis until something is done to alleviate it. In keeping with the studies of Latane & Darley cited previously, it was decided to measure the speed of the helping response in terms of the time from the onset of the crisis (the confederate asking for help) to the time at which a member of the group left the experimental room to seek assistance.

It was found in the postexperimental interviews that there were several possible reasons for a group member to leave the room; namely, seeking assistance directly from the experimenter ("I was going to tell the experimenter what was going on so that he could do something"), directly trying to solve the problem ("I was going to get some sugar"), or vaguely going for some type of assistance ("I wanted to find somebody who could help").

Individual Difference Correlates of Speed of Response

The correlations between speed of response and various individual differences of the leaders on the personality and background measures were obtained by normalizing the distribution of report speeds within each experimental condition and pooling these scores across all conditions. These correlations are shown in Tables 4. and 5. Personality and background measures showed no important or significant correlations with speed of response to the emergency.

Reactions to the Experiment

After the post-experimental interview and debriefing, subjects were asked to fill out a final questionnaire (see Appendix B) concerning their mood and their reactions to the experiment. On an adjective check-list, 85% of the subjects said they were "interested", 69% "glad to have taken part", 57% "concerned about the problem", 33% "surprised", 24% "satisfied", 23% "relieved", 15% "happy", 4% "angry at myself", 2% "confused", and 2% "annoyed". No subjects indicated that they were "angry at the experimenter", "afraid", or "ashamed" (subjects checked an average of 4.6 adjectives). All subjects (100%) said that they would be willing to take part in similar experiments in the future, 96% said deceptions were necessary, and 96% that they were justified. On a 5-point scale, 97% found the experiment either "very interesting" or "interesting", the two extreme points. The only sign of a difference in reaction between intervening groups and non-intervening groups was that 47% of the former and only 24% of the latter

TABLE 4.--Personality correlates for leaders of standardized speed of reporting the seizure

Personality Test	r
Berkowitz Social Responsibility Scale	-.04
Christie's Machiavellianism Scale	.03
F scale (Christie's revision)	.12
Marlowe-Crowne Need for Approval Scale	.05

TABLE 5.--Biographical correlates for leaders of standardized speed of reporting the seizure

Item	r
Year in college	-.02
Age	-.03
Birth Order	.03
Number of siblings	.10
Father's educational level	.07

checked the most extreme interest ($\chi^2 = 9.64, p < .05$). In general, then, reactions to the experiment were highly positive.

CHAPTER IV

Discussion

This study was designed to investigate one of the dimensions of helping behavior in emergency situations, specifically, the effect of various types of leaders. It was found that leaders of a discussion group showed the behaviors characteristic of what Bass (1949) has termed emergent leadership, react significantly faster to aid an individual in trouble than do leaders who are either arbitrarily appointed or who are least likely to be termed emergent leaders. It was also found that there were significant differences in the number of overthrows of leaders among groups with these three types of leaders, with the Pseudo-elected leader groups showing the largest number of such overthrows. These results thus support the initial hypotheses of this study.

There are several possible reasons for these results. Several studies (Bass, 1949, 1961; Bass et al., 1953; Heinicke & Bales, 1953) have shown that emergent leaders in originally leaderless groups act in such a way to maintain their position in later sessions of the group meeting. They possess the qualifications for leadership and assert these qualifications in the situation in order to solidify their position and prevent the next most likely emergent leader from gaining a foothold and taking over the position of leader. In this present study, the subjects selected as Emergent leaders were selected on the basis of these qualifications (e.g., offering suggestions, qualifying, seeking consensus, etc.) which they

showed in the original leaderless practice discussion session. In the later discussion sessions, they continued to exert their power in the same way and in this manner solidified their position as leader. Consequently, in the crisis situation, when the confederate appealed for aid, the Emergent leader acted as leader again and directed what was to be done to give aid. He sees himself and is seen by the other group members as the leader, the one best qualified to direct what should be done, and acts accordingly.

In the same way, the Pseudo-elected leader was the member of the group who showed the least amount of suggestions, etc., in the initial leaderless discussion. He was the one who would least likely be termed leader. During the subsequent group discussion periods, this type of leader was observed to act differently than the Emergent leader. He maintained a passive role, usually waiting for the other members of the group to come to some consensus and solution to the problem. Unlike the Emergent Leader, he did not dominate the discussion nor attempt to impose his own solution on the others. The normal sequence in groups led by such leaders was that the other group member who would have been termed the emergent leader took over and directed the discussion and when a solution had been reached the Pseudo-elected leader took it to the experimenter. Thus, the Pseudo-elected leader's role was one in which he took no active role during the discussions and acted only as a "messenger boy" to the experimenter.

In this case, when the confederate asked for help from the group, the Pseudo-elected leader did not possess the qualities nor the group support to direct what should be done in the emergency situation and consequently he was overthrown and the real emergent leader in these groups assumed the role of leader. The Pseudo-elected leader was seen as ineffective and when he did not quickly respond to the confederate, a coup was staged by the individual who had the qualities to be a leader in the situation. These results were consistent with Hamblin's (1958) findings in which an inefficient leader was overthrown in an "emergency" situation (a shuffleboard game in which the rules were changed without the subjects' knowledge).

From the foregoing discussion and the results of the present experiment, it should be clear that, at least in this situation, it is the leader's qualifications rather than the process by which he was selected (e.g., voted upon versus appointed) which is the important variable in relationship to his effectiveness and potential for being overthrown.

The findings related to the overthrow of the Pseudo-elected leaders also support Torrance's theory of leadership under stress (1961). According to this theory, groups prefer continuity in leadership from non-stressful to stressful situations. Even established leaders, however, must continue to validate their leadership roles by providing the structure and expertise necessary for group survival. Thus, leaders of long and distinguished experience must go to great lengths to

to demonstrate again and again their expertness. There will be conflicts and even failure to survive as a group, when the designated leader fails to provide the essential structure and expertness (Torrance, 1954). The incompetent leader may be abandoned or otherwise deposed and an able and popular individual spontaneously may assume command either by mutual consent or at a somewhat unconscious level.

Thus on the basis of this theory, the results may be explained in the following way: the Emergent leader acts in such a way in each discussion session to provide the structure necessary for group functioning and shows his expertness in order to re-validate his position. He acts the same way in the emergency situation by maintaining control of the group and delegating what must be done. The Pseudo-elected leader is seen as incompetent and not validly possessing the position of leader during the group discussion sessions, but his incompetence is of no great import in these sessions because another member fulfills his role and directs the group to a solution. In the crisis situation, the Pseudo-elected leader's incompetence is of importance, and in order to take care of the emergency efficiently, he must be deposed or overthrown by the group. The factors of the Pseudo-elected leader's inefficiency, which is seen during the first session and is reinforced during subsequent sessions, and the real emergent leader's attempt in such groups to take over the discussions, combine to bring about the overthrow of the Pseudo-elected leader in the emergency situation.

What can be said about the Appointed leader? Since the Appointed Leaders were always the third persons to come to the testing room, it would be expected that by chance they would vary greatly as to their competence for the situation (i.e., some of them may show emergent leadership qualities, others may show characteristics of what has been termed here the Pseudo-elected leader). In order to find out the response and overthrow characteristics of this group, a split was done, dividing them into initially high and initially low "output" (giving suggestions, etc.) on the test trials before the emergency. Table 6 shows this division of the Appointed leaders and the responses of their groups to the emergency; Table 7 shows the overthrow characteristics of these groups. Although the sample size (13) is very small in this group, both Tables 6 and 7 parallel the same results as the Emergent-Pseudo-elected leader differences shown in tables 1 and 2. That is, in this emergency situation, the variable that seems to have the greatest effect on whether or not direct help will be given is not the process of selection of the leader by the group but rather the individual's "emergence potential", those qualifications which relate directly to his abilities and effectiveness as a leader. This is also the variable affecting the overthrow potential of the individual leader; the higher the "emergence potential" of the particular leader, the lower his overthrow potential.

Other factors are also important. The emergency situ-

TABLE 6.--The effects of Appointed leader type on the likelihood and speed of response

Leader type	N	% responding by 3 minutes	\bar{X} time in sec.	speed score
Initially High	6	67%	64	.48
Initially Low	7	29%	82	.28

TABLE 7.--Appointed leader type and the number of overthrows

leader type	number overthrown	number not overthrown	total
Initially High	1	5	6
Initially Low	6	1	7

ation is such that it necessitates and requires some type of quick response by the leader. The Emergent leader responds quickly and adequately to the demands of the situation, the Pseudo-elected leader does not, in the same way that he did not respond adequately to the demands of the discussion situations and allowed another member of the group to emerge as the real leader of the group. Also, the group members have expectations of how the leader should act and if his actions do not correspond to their expectations, then he is likely to be overthrown.

Latane & Darley (1968) have proposed a three-stage process before action can be taken in an emergency situation: If a person is to intervene, he must first notice the event, he must interpret it as an emergency, and he must decide that it is his personal responsibility to act. At each of these preliminary stages, the bystander to an emergency can remove himself from the decision process and thus fail to help. He can fail to notice the event, he can fail to interpret it as an emergency, or he can fail to assume the responsibility to take action.

In the present study, the first two misperceptions or failures of perception are precluded. The design was such that the other group members could not fail to notice the event or fail to interpret it as an emergency. They were face to face with the person who needed help and there was a direct appeal from him for aid. The third step, that of failure to assume

personal responsibility to take action, could be a possible explanation for the inaction of those group members who failed to do something about the situation by the time the three minutes had passed. However, from the observations of the experimenter of these groups that did not intervene in the allotted time, the explanation for this inaction was not that subjects perceived the event as not being their responsibility personally, but rather that they were waiting for their leader to act. Most heads were turned toward the leader to see what he would do. When he did not take some action to intervene, the real emergent leader took over.

Latane & Darley find that many of their subjects fail to intervene in emergency situations, especially when they perceive themselves to be with others who are undergoing the crisis situation with them (Latane & Darley, 1968; Darley & Latane, 1968a, 1968b). These authors point to the effects of the ambiguity of the emergency situation and the diffusion of responsibility to account for the inaction of these subjects in the emergency situations. In comparison, in the present study, the results show a greater percentage of subjects intervening. The reasons for this difference include the following: 1. Isolation vs. face to face. The present study uses a design in which all the people involved interact in a face to face manner. In one study (Darley & Latane, 1968b) the authors use a situation in which each person is isolated in a separate room. 2. Naivete of subjects. In another study, Latane & Darley (1968)

put a naive subject in with two confederates who were instructed not to act during the emergency situation (smoke filling the room) and found less intervention than in a naive subject alone condition. The design of the present study was such that except for the confederate who appealed for help, all of the subjects were naive. The group composition was thus different in this situation and this may account for the differential rate of responding found in the two studies. 3. Direct appeal for help. The confederate in this study made a direct appeal for help to the others in the group and to the leader in particular, and also told them what could be done to aid him. In Latane & Darley's studies, no such direct appeal is used, rather the situation is so constructed that it is ambiguous and there is no direction as to what should be done. 4. Ability to escape or ignore the crisis. Latane & Darley's experimental designs are such that they allow the naive subject to escape or ignore the emergency situation, e.g., putting them with subjects who are instructed not to act. No such possibility to escape or ignore the emergency was present in this study.

The present study was conducted to investigate a possible relevant dimension of helping behavior--the effect of leader type. One main problem encountered in the planning of this study was involved in the conceptualization of helping behavior. How is helping behavior defined? What various behaviors may be classified as helping behavior? Is a kind word to the victim the same type of behavior as attempting to intervene in the sit-

uation? There are a variety of ways in which a person can respond to such a situation. First of all, he may act in some positive manner or he may ignore the situation completely. If he chooses to act in a positive way, there are again several alternative ways of acting. The difficulty in this study was to decide upon a particular type of helping behavior as a criterion. It was decided to use the act of actively seeking help by leaving the experimental room as the criterion of helping behavior.

There are other conceivable behaviors which could have been employed as the criterion. Some of the other reactions which occurred during the crisis situation were verbal in nature (e.g., asking the victim, "What is th matter?", "Do you have any insulin?", saying to him, "Take it easy, relax."); others were motor in nature (e.g., moving toward the victim, touching him on the arm or hand). Appendix C shows the frequency of these and other reactions. The criterion of actively seeking help was decided upon because it is an overt and active response to the situation which implies definite intention to give aid to the victim. It was experimentally feasible to measure a response such as this. What is indicated, though, is the necessity to study in a much more detailed manner the variety of possible helping responses which may occur in an emergency or crisis situation. This investigation ideally should include a cataloguing of the possible internal and covert reactions of the bystanders as well as their overt re-

actions. Such an investigation may reveal a partial explanation of the reasons found for non-intervention that have been found in this study and those mentioned previously by Latane and Darley.

Variations in the present study could also be valuable in delineating reactions to emergency situations. It would be interesting to find out what would have happened if the experimenter had not been physically present and the group consequently had to seek aid in some other fashion. It would be informative to see precisely what would have been done in this case and whether or not the leader would handle the situation in the same manner.

Another possible variation would be to have all members in the group except the leader be confederates of the experimenter and to study the consequent actions of the three types of leaders. How would the Pseudo leader react in this case? If there were no one who would take over and act as the leader would he still wait for the other group members to do something or would he react in the same manner as the Emergent leader? If all of the other members of the group were hostile to the leader, would the Emergent leader still react in the same manner or do something to appease the other group members?

Other variations of the present study could also include the manipulation of group size to discover if the diffusion of responsibility hypothesis proposed by Darley & Latane (1968) in their seizure study is also applicable in this present situation.

If the groups had been of larger and smaller sizes would there have been differing results from what was found with groups of five people? Which would be the more important variable for helping--group size or leader type?

It should also be added at this point that, ideally, studies such as the present one and its extensions should be conducted in a field setting. Such studies as those of Bryan & Test (1967), Piliavin et al. (1969) and studies mentioned in Latane & Darley (1970) have shown that it is feasible to take the study of helping behavior into its natural setting. There are of course numerous difficulties with a field setting, but it should be constantly kept in mind by investigators in this area that the phenomena they are dealing with are real-life phenomena and should be studied whenever possible in the settings of their natural occurrence.

As stated previously, a number of different explanations have been advanced to account for the non-intervention of bystanders in emergency situations. The case of Kitty Genovese served to highlight the problem and to bring back to the surface the cries about the apathy of people living in today's world, especially those living in today's large dehumanizing cities. Apathy--the idea that people just do not care about others, even when the others are in some sort of trouble, that people are too busy and preoccupied with their own affairs to be concerned with the affairs of others--this is only one of the large number of explanations for non-intervention and in-

activity in such situations. Latane and Darley have raised the alternative explanation of the misperception of the situation. Other explanations offered include the premise that people do not want to get involved for fear of reprisals either from the attacker or the victim or that people are simply afraid to help. All of these, and combinations of the various explanations, may all be plausible reasons and may, indeed, be what is operating in the situation. At this point, it is difficult to lay more stress on one explanation than another, because the whole area is just beginning to be explored. Indeed, the idea that a single explanation or determinant exists is probably unrealistic and foolish. Nevertheless, the reasons for non-intervention must be studied, discovered, and explained if there is to be a full understanding of this area of behavior.

CHAPTER V

Summary and Conclusion

The present study was designed to investigate the phenomenon of helping behavior in a crisis situation from a group process-leadership point of view. It was pointed out that previous studies in this area had approached the question from an aggregate group or non-interaction point of view. It was also pointed out that many of these studies have either not actually used a crisis situation in their designs or have so constructed their approaches as to preclude any specification or discovery of the processes which operate in a fully interacting group under such an emergency situation.

Three types of leaders were employed in this study: the Emergent leader (the person in the originally leaderless group who showed the greatest amount of suggestion giving, working toward group agreement, etc.), the Appointed leader (in this case, the third subject coming to the experimental room was arbitrarily appointed leader), and the Pseudo-elected leader (the person who showed the least amount of suggestions, talked the least, etc., i.e., the person least likely termed an emergent leader). Although several classifications or distinctions of leaders are delineated in the literature, this particular typology of leadership was utilized because it was felt to be the most salient type in terms of the situation being studied; it allows for insights into the process of leader emergence in both normal group processes and in emergency coping and it also allows for a test of the question of which variable is more important for group

Leadership - appointment to the position, i.e., the position itself, or the qualities of the individual who holds that position.

From several previous studies pertaining to this area of investigation, two specific hypotheses were tested in the present study. These hypotheses were: 1. In a crisis situation, an Emergent Leader should act more quickly and be more effective than a leader who in fact has no leadership qualities (the Pseudo-elected leader), as defined by the criteria of emergent leadership. An arbitrarily Appointed leader should fall somewhere between these two. 2. There should be more overthrowing of leaders (or mutinies by followers) in the Pseudo-elected leader condition than in either the Appointed leader condition or the Emergent leader conditions.

In order to study these hypotheses, the following experimental design was employed: Five subjects (one of whom was the confederate of the experimenter) were brought together ostensibly to study group problem-solving processes. Subjects were given personality questionnaires and in an initial familiarization interchange, the confederate mentioned that he had diabetes and could not get overworked or overexcited due to his condition. The group was then given a sample problem of the type they were to discuss and after this was gone through, a leader was selected for the group in one of the following manners: Appointed leader (the third subject who arrived at the experimental room was appointed by the experimenter), Emergent leader (the group members wrote down the name of the subject whom they wished to be leader; the experimenter always named the subject who gave the most suggestions, etc.); Pseu-

do-elected (the group also "elected" the leader in the manner mentioned above; the experimenter always named the subject who gave the least suggestions, etc.).

Subjects then were given four discussion problems, one at a time. During all discussions the experimenter was not present. While the group was discussing the fourth problem, the confederate began to complain that he was having a diabetic reaction and that he needed some sugar; he said he could not get the sugar himself and that he needed help. The experimenter observed the actions taken to aid the confederate and noted what was done by the leader and by the other members of the group.

The criterion of helping was the departure from the experimental room by a subject in search of help for the victim. If the group had not done something directly to get aid for the victim by the time three minutes had elapsed from the time the confederate first asked for help, the experiment was terminated. After termination, the experimenter asked for a detailed explanation of the happenings from each subject and from the leader in detail. The true purpose of the experiment was then explained to all and all subjects were given a final questionnaire concerning their mood and reactions to the experiment.

The results obtained supported both original hypotheses. The type of leader in the group had a major effect on the likelihood and speed with which the emergency was reported, with Emergent leader groups reporting the emergency quickest and most often and Pseudo-elected leader group the slowest and least often. The lar-

gest number of leader overthrows were recorded in groups with a Pseudo-elected leader. Groups with an Emergent leader showed no overthrows at all. Personality and background measures showed no important or significant correlations with speed of response to the emergency. Reactions to the experiment were generally favorable as was shown by the subjects' responses to the final questionnaire.

Several explanations were offered for these results. Several previous studies cited have shown that emergent leaders in originally leaderless groups act in such a way as to maintain their position in later sessions of the group meeting. This can help to explain the reasons why the Emergent leader maintained his position in the crisis situation and avoided being overthrown by the group. During the crisis, the Emergent leader acted as leader again, directing what should be done. He saw himself and was perceived by other group members as the leader in both a discussion and a crisis situation and acted accordingly. The findings related to the overthrow of the Pseudo-elected leaders were also related to Torrance's (1961) theory of leadership under stress.

The findings of this study were related to Latane & Darley's (1968) three-stage process of intervention in emergency situations. It was pointed out that the design of the present study was such as to preclude any of the three possible misperceptions of the crisis situation. It was also shown that the design of the present study differed from the designs employed in previous studies by Latane & Darley in several ways: 1. it utilized a design in which all of

the participants interacted in a face to face manner. 2. all subjects employed were naive in terms of the purpose of the experiment. 3. a direct appeal for help was employed. 4. no possibility to escape or ignore the emergency was present in the design.

A short discussion of the variety of helping behaviors was included and several different variations of the present study were discussed. As a final point, it was noted that no single explanation in all probability will provide a final understanding to the diverse phenomena involved in helping behavior in emergency situations.

APPENDIX A
Sample Personal Data Questionnaire

NAME _____

BIRTHPLACE _____

AGE _____

YEAR IN SCHOOL _____

NUMBER OF CHILDREN IN YOUR FAMILY _____

YOUR ORDER OF BIRTH IN YOUR FAMILY (firstborn, secondborn, etc.)

HOW MANY YEARS DID YOUR FATHER ATTEND SCHOOL? _____

YOUR MAJOR IN SCHOOL _____

EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES AND INTERESTS _____

APPENDIX B

Sample Questionnaire Concerning Subject's Reaction To Experiment

1. Listed below are a number of adjectives which may characterize how you feel right now and what your reactions are to the experiment that has just taken place. Please place a checkmark (✓) next to those which you feel characterize your mood and your reactions at this time. You may check more than one adjective.

_____ INTERESTED
 _____ SURPRISED
 _____ HAPPY
 _____ ASHAMED
 _____ CONFUSED
 _____ GLAD TO HAVE TAKEN PART
 _____ CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROBLEM
 _____ AFRAID
 _____ SATISFIED
 _____ RELIEVED
 _____ ANNOYED
 _____ ANGRY AT MYSELF
 _____ ANGRY AT EXPERIMENTER

2. Would you be willing in the future to take part in experiments similar to the one you have just taken part in? (Check one)

_____ Yes _____ No

3. Do you feel that deceptions are necessary to study situations such as the one that has just taken place? (Check one)

_____ Yes _____ No

4. Do you feel that such deceptions are justified? (Check one)

_____ Yes _____ No

5. On the following scale please place a checkmark nearest to the point where you feel your attitude falls.

Do you think that the study you have just taken part in was interesting?

very interesting	interesting	neither interesting nor uninteresting	uninter- esting	very uninteresting

APPENDIX C

Frequencies of Other Types of Helping

<u>Type of Helping Behavior</u>	<u>Frequency of Cases (N 39)</u>	<u>Number of Subjects Showing Behavior</u>
1. Telling the victim to "Relax" or "Take it easy"	16	18
2. Movement directly toward the victim	13	19
3. Asking the victim "What's the matter" after he had told them once already	8	9
4. Touching the victim or taking his hand	6	6
5. Saying to self or others "Wait a minute, let's think this out"	5	7
6. Asking others "Does anyone have anything with sugar in it?"	2	2
7. Asking the victim "Do you have any insulin?"	2	2

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